Post by king neb on Dec 15, 2005 22:33:55 GMT -5
Whitefield Theological Seminary
Samuel Frost
Biblical Ethics (PHL 603)
Comparing and Contrasting
Gordon Clark, John Murray and Greg L. Bahnsen On Biblical Ethics..1
I wish to use Gordon Clark’s view as well as Murray’s and Bahnsen’s. Clark’s
view is briefly stated in Essays on Ethics and Politics (Trinity, 1992). Bahnsen’s two
books are considered, By This Standard: The Authority of God’s Law Today (ICE, 1985)
and Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Presbyterian & Reformed, 1977). John Murray’s
classic work referred to in this essay is Principles of Conduct: Aspects of Biblical Ethics
(Eerdmans, 2001 – reprinted from 1957).
Reformed theology has always asserted the necessity of applying the Christian
gospel to all cultures. Obviously, this is going to effect government and law. There is no
shortage in Reformation history of political theory. There is also no shortage of actual
examples of Christian experiments at governmental theory: Geneva, the Netherlands, the
Puritans, Scotland, Cromwellian England, and the early American colonists. One rule
underlies all of these attempts: All Scripture is relevant. Marcionism, antinomianism, and
secular humanism are discarded immediately. God’s word is the norm for all matters of
faith and practice.
I. General Thesis
Gordon Clark’s view with regards to biblical law is outlined in Essays under the
heading “Capital Punishment and the Bible” (12). On page 13,14 he wrote, “God
abolished the theocracy.” The reason behind this is, of course, the Gospel age. He bases
this on the Matthaen text found in 21:33-45 (“The Parable of the Unjust Vineyard
Workers”). There, the vineyard owner’s son return to the land and the tenants kill him.
The question asked by Jesus as to the fate of the tenants. They answer that they should
die a miserable death. What they did, in fact, was seal their own fate. In AD 70 Israel
was destroyed. Thus, “The kingdom would be taken from the Jews, the theocracy would.2
be ended, and a new order would be instituted…So it has happened. There no longer is
any chosen nation. Therefore the detailed civil and criminal code of Israel is no longer
binding.”
However, this logically cannot mean that “capital punishment is wrong.” To say
that the theocracy is abolished does not mean that the details of her law could not be
wisely adopted today. Then he concludes, “we might even wisely execute adulterers and
pornographers.” It is wrong, logically, to argue that if one or more laws in the law are
adopted all of them must be. This is just “bad logic.” The question is, “is capital
punishment ever right? must be answered in the affirmative.”
John Murray deals with the question under the chapter entitled “Law and Grace.”
The law “commands and demands” (184). It “propounds the will of God” for holy living
(184). The application of the law to the believer and to society is the will of God.
However, “the epochal change” (188) in the redemptive events of Christ’s work and
mission has altered the way the old covenant Israelite and the new covenant Christian
obey these commands. The Christian, as Paul, was “not under any obligation to observe
such rites and practices” of the Mosaic commands (189). Though he did, of course, as
the Acts tells us, and as Paul himself said: “to the Jew, I am a Jew.” Expediency and not
obligation is the notion here. So, for both Murray and Clark, the law, in principle is still
the governing standard of holiness, but many aspects, including many commands, are not
obligatory.
For Greg L. Bahnsen, the matter is not so simple. In some instances he clearly
states that the entire law is to be obeyed, and that no abrogation, not one jot or tittle, has
been altered. Yet, on the other hand, he states that “This is not to say that the re are no.3
changes from the Old to New Testament. Indeed, there are – important ones” (Standard,
3). His principle is one of continuity, not discontinuity. That is, unless the NT
specifically repeals any law then every law is in force. Thus, in this view, the ceremonial
laws and temple rites are repealed, or rather, confirmed in the fuller meaning of the Christ
event.
For Clark, every detailed is done away with, yet, on a logical score, this is not a
reason for rejecting their application out right. It is an “open question” as it pertains to
each detail (13). Murray uses the laws as a standard for holiness and sin, and Clark
would as well, but, as we shall see, not only does Murray reject the ceremonial aspects,
but some civil applications as well. Bahnsen endorses every jot and tittle, whether in
view of Christ from the ceremonial aspects (for example, we still have a High Priest), or
from civil justice.
II. Application of the thesis: Marriage
I will use the examples of marriage and penology to show the applications of their
views because these two issues form a comprehensive overview for each of them. First,
marriage. Let is be noted that Murray states, “Jesus is saying [in the Sermon on the
Mount] that he came not to abrogate any part of the Mosaic law” (150). Let us also note
that the Mosaic issued the death penalty for adultery. Murray admits as much on page
54. Having these two things in mind we may continue.
The texts in question on marriage are Dt 24:1-3; Mt 5:22. There, Jesus states that
one who divorces commits adultery if a second marriage takes place, unless for sexual
fornication. There is no need to go into what Jesus is saying here. Bahnsen gives such a
wide semantic domain to the word porneia that it almost means anything associated with.wrong sexual behavior. More on this later. The point in Murray is that Jesus does not seem to issue the death penalty for adultery in the case of a second marriage. Murray
writes, “In the exercise of [His] authority he abrogated….the Mosaic provisions
regarding divorce; by implication he abrogated the Old Testament sanction by which
divorce was penalized; and he instituted divorce for the cause of adultery” (57). From
what Murray says above, and from what he says here, we must say that Mur ray has
contradicted himself. Either Jesus did, or did not abrogate. It cannot be both.
Now, giving Murray his due, he does try to explain himself. On page 55 he
writes, “The abolition of the Old Testament penalty in no way interferes with the
permanent sanctity of the precept itself. It is the enhanced emphasis upon the sanctity of
the precept that makes possible the abrogation of the corporeal penalty.” In other words,
the abrogation of the death penalty for adultery enhances the sanctity of marriage.
Marriage, somehow, is seen as more holy by lessening the penalty for breaking its vows.
Rather than death (which would seem to surely emphasize the holiness of the union),
divorce suffices. Murray does not make much sense here. What it seems that he is
saying is that by abrogating the Mosaic statute, Jesus is not really abrogating it, but
fulfilling it.
Bahnsen sees the line of reasoning here as contradictory. An abrogation is an
abrogation whether it is in one, or in a jot, or a tittle. This is not a ceremonial law for
him, but a moral and civil one. “Christ did not in any way relax the law” (Theonomy,
98). From Matthew 19, however, Jesus appeals to what Murray calls the creation
ordinance of marriage (“In the beginning it was not so…”). Bahnsen is willing to say
that if Jesus did anything he strengthened the Mosaic ordinance. In Dt 24:1-4 “unclean.5
thing” is the cause for giving the wife a certificate of divorce (‘ervath dabar- indecency;
lit. nakedness of a matter – Heb.). The range of activity this might include appears to be
wide. The LXX uses aschemon pragma (shameful work). The connotation is clearly
sexual, but whether it is limited to porneia is a concern too lengthy for this essay.
Bahnsen defines porneia in the widest of ways. Re gardless of the definition,
Bahnsen does not quote the entire context of Matthew 19. After considering this, we will
sum up his presentation. The disciples replied to Jesus’ words with a startling reaction
that is not reproved by Jesus, but is, rather confirmed in his response. “But,” they say, “
if this is the case, then it is better not to marry!” If sexual indecency in the widest of
ways was meant, or if the Hebrew “unclean thing” was even wider semantically, then this
response seems hardly credible. They would be saying something to the effect, “if
divorce is allowed for a wide variety inordinately deemed immorality, then it is better not
to marry.” Jesus does not reprove them, but says, “Not everyone can accept this
teaching…others have renounced marriage because of the kingdom of heaven. The one
who can accept this should accept it” (Mt 19:10-12). The teaching in question is “anyone
who divorces his wife….and marries another.” What Jesus is saying is that it is better
not to marry, and that this restrictive measure is because of the approaching kingdom of
heaven. Do we not find Paul saying that same thing in I Co 7? And why does Paul
restrict marriage? “Because the time is short, brothers.” The eschatological dimension
must be considered.
Bahnsen is correct to say that capital punishment for adultery is not considered in
this passage. Neither is Moses contradicted with the woman caught in adultery (John
8:1- ff). By going back to the “beginning” Jesus affirms Moses, but certainly limits the.6
permissive nature of the Mosaic command. However, this teaching concerned “those
who could receive it.” In the main, though, Bahnsen stays true to his line of reasoning
that Jesus does not abrogate the Mosaic law. Murray on the other hand flatly contradicts
himself.
II. Penology
III.
We have seen that Murray abrogates the death penalty for adultery, whereas
Bahnsen does not. Clark, as noted above, sees no logical reason for rejecting outright the
wisdom found in putting the death the adulterer or pornographer. Yet, the reason for
Clark is logical analysis. For Clark, after the destruction of the theocratic kingdom of
Israel in AD 70, the whole law, in its detail, is no longer binding. But this hardly means
that it has no wisdom in its details, or that its details should not be considered for
governmental application. God commands that we study his word and seek to live it out
in our lives.
Bahnsen, on the other hand, stresses ethical obedience to the whole law, and that
Clark’s “latent antinomianism” is simply due to his placing reason above Scripture.
Again, he would charge Murray with the same, sharply disagreeing with him Theonomy.
Murray affirms the “creation ordinance” of the death penalty (Gn 9:2-5). He affirms the
“permanent relevance and validity” (112). But, this is for murder. Does the same hold
true for other crimes specifically mentioned in the Torah? Murray’s answer is clear, “It
is conceivable that the progress of revelation would remove the necessity for the penal
sanction. This is the case with the death penalty for adultery. And the same holds true
for many other penal sanctions in the Mosaic economy” (118). Again, since he abrogated
the death penalty for adultery the “implication [is that] he abrogated the Mosaic death
penalty” (119).
When considering polygamy and divorce in the older covenant, Murray notes that
these were permitted, yet restricted from gross abuse. A better word he uses is
“tolerated” (16). Yet, this does not make them legitimate for all time. “That is to say,
these practices were basically wrong; they were violations of the creation
ordinance…They were really contrary to the revealed will of God and rested under his
judgment” (16). Murray works out his theory much in the same way I do: by an appeal to
progressive revelation. The guidance of the Holy Spirit upon the collective community
of believers necessitates that a general ethic for Christian conduct will come into the
forefront, while all the while using the Scriptures as the stratum of truth. “We ha ve the
completion of the revelatory process” (18). For personal living each “existential
situation” must be confronted with Scripture and history. We cannot overestimate the
Holy Spirit in our hearts through the last days redemption in Jesus. But this is going over
the issue at hand. Let it be said that Murray abrogates several, if not most (except
murder) penal sanctions of the Mosaic law.
We have already noted that Murray stated further in the book that Jesus “is saying
that he came not to abrogate any part of the Mosaic law” (150). He agrees with my thesis
in Bahnsen’s outline for Theonomy in Christian Ethics given for this course; i.e., he
writes, “What we call the ritual or ceremonial comes within the scope of his declaration
as well as the moral” (ital. mine, 150). Bahnsen makes the distinction between form and
meaning. The law demands the perpetual validity for a High Priest. Jesus is our eternal
High Priest (yet he was not from the tribe of Levi, but Melchizadek). I found this.8
distinction to be arbitrary and forced. But I am saying too much at this point. The issue
here is how Murray can assert that Jesus came not to abrogate any of Moses’ law, yet, as
we have seen, abrogates quite a good deal of it under the rubric of “progressive
revelation.” How can this be? Murray, on the same page, wrote, “He did come to
discontinue the observance of the rites and ceremonies of the old economy. But it is not
correct to say that he came to abrogate them.” I cannot see any difference, and neither
could Clark. However, the appeal to a procession (a jot and tittle being abrogated in light
of the “things of the age to come” coming into their permanency through the transition
from Old to New is entirely my scheme, and is the appeal Murray makes). The problem
for Murray, though, is that he does not have any terminus.
The terminus for Bahnsen is “until the heavens and the earth pass away.” When
that happens, then abrogation will occur. Therefore, it is clear that for Bahnsen to remain
consistent, every penal sanction must receive its just application by the hand of the state.
None of them have been abrogated. “We too endorse the justice of God’s penal code, if
the Bible is to be the foundation for our Christian ethic” (Standard, 280).
IV. Conclusion.
Clark remains consistent in that he totally abrogates the entire theocratic system in
one fell swoop. Yet, logically, this does not mean that none of it applies, or can be
applied today. It is an open question and each proposal must be looked at in detail before
it can be decided. For Clark, the whole counsel of God is required for such a task.
However, he made it clear that we are not under any obligation to obey Mosaic law
simply because it is in the Bible. Many things are “in” the Bible that could not possibly.9
be applied today. This does not deter, however, from their intent and meaning. It may be
that we are obeying Christ in not applying them. The logic here is impeccable.
For Bahnsen, Clark’s view is akin to autonomous human reasoning (logic) over
God’s word. But that is not what Clark is saying. Clark stresses the whole counsel of
God, and the Bible is replete with justification for using logical rigidity. Bahnsen himself
somewhat echoes this sentiment. It is not a simple case of simply reading the Torah and
saying we will do this. Each case must be decided for itself. And Bahnsen applies the
whole counsel as well. He seems to make the issue forced, though, when he asks “by
what standard” are we to govern? Clark’s answer would unequivocally be God’s word.
The reason, in other words, Clark dismisses theonomy is simply because Scripture tells
him to do so. There are other alternatives that are just as biblically viable than
reconstructionism.
Murray’s view appeals to the much more gene ral creation ordinances. Indeed, the
Mosaic institution is seen as actually sanctioning and tolerating things that are flat out
wrong from the standpoint of these creation ordinances. For example, Moses permitted
divorce for a wide variety of things (whatsoever constitutes an “improper thing”) because
of the “hardness of heart. But it was not so in the beginning.” Here, Murray recognizes
that Jesus, while not abrogating Moses on this point, is over-riding him and appealing to
creation and the original function and purpose of the marriage bond. Yet Murray does
not stop here and insists that Jesus, by annulling the capital punishment for adultery was,
implicitly, annulling other capital offenses. In fact, he explicitly uses the word
“abrogate.” Murray never explains how this can be before heaven and earth pass away
except under the rubric of “progressive revelation” and that the Levitical system and.10
Mosaic penal code “anticipated” and formed an organic union with Christ, thus meeting
their fullness in his substance and thus ending in him.
Before we can go on, it is pertinent to make some notes on Bahnsen’s book By
This Standard. On page 132 he states, “The law of the Lord is fully and forever valid.”
He quotes Mt 5:17-19 for support. Murray correctly understood that when Jesus said this
he meant the law as it stood in Moses’ time. That is, he came not to abrogate the
Levitical laws, the dietary laws, or the ceremonial laws. The Temple stood, and the
priests were active and he meant for every Jew to carry out every jot and tittle of the law
as written. Let us resume with Bahnsen. “God’s law is eternal and is not to be altered”
(150). Yet, he also states that it is the word of God that instructs us “to see an altered
application of those laws” (ital. his, 164). Further, “The New Covenant word teaches
that some of God’s Old Covenant ordinances were not intended to be continuously
observed in the same manner throughout redemptive history…the Levitical priesthood
has been changed…Hence the sacrifices, feasts, etc. of the old order are not binding”
(165). This is a contradiction. The same as found in Murray, though Murray remedies it
with the notion of process of elimination in the fullness of revelation.
Not all Scripture is the law. The law is specifically referred to as the Mosaic law.
Secondly, if we accept Murray’s contention that Jesus meant every application of the law
as it was understood by the original audience, then Bahnsen’s distinction between
“meaning” and “form” fails. Bahnsen correctly pays attention to the “until the heavens
and the earth (land) pass away shall no wise the law will pass away” as being the
terminus. Both Murray and Bahnsen want a progressive revelation that, on the one hand
abrogates and alters the literal application, and on the other, fulfills the anticipatory-.11
shadowy form in the person of Christ. But how can this happen “unless the heavens and
the earth pass away”? If the terminus for any abrogation, any alteration, any change from
shadow to reality is found in the passing of the heavens and the earth, then the heavens
and the earth must also be progressively passing from the old to the new heavens and the
new earth. The logic here is missed by both scholars. You cannot have a change of the
law without a change of the heavens and the earth! Bahnsen wants alteration, and
Murray wants abrogation, but neither want to see the heavens and the earth as changing
into the new heavens and earth. There is a serious, serious problem here.
Either they are completely wrong here, or there was a change in the heavens and
the earth as well as a change in the abrogation/fullness/confirmation motif. You cannot
have any abrogation without affecting the terminus. Therefore, if the heavens and the
earth are taken as the literal Newtonian universe, then we have a major problem. If they
have not been changed, then no law has been abrogated in its least form at all. That is
the force of the combined exegesis of Murray and Bahnsen. It is the force of what Jesus
said. Until this matter is solved, the issue of law observance for today stands as an open
question.
As for Clark, he sees the entire theocratic nation as obliterated! This would mean
that the new heavens and the new earth are realities! You cannot have abrogation “until
the heavens and the earth pass away.” The only conclusion was that they were passing
away. The heavens and the Land (ghV in Greek is translated “earth,” “region,” or “land.”
Lightfoot notes that Israel in the Talmud was constantly referred to as “the Land” or
“haararts” in Hebrew – see Lightfoot’s, Commentary on the NT from the Talmud and
Hebraica: Volume I, Hendricksen. 1979; repr. 1859) must refer to, then, covenant Israel.
(“the Land”) and the Temple (“the heavens”). If Lightfoot’s exegesis is correct (and it is
most detailed), then the problem for Murray and Clark is solved, finding the terminus of
fulfillment from the old shadowy Levitical forms (the Law) in the final overthrowing of
Jerusalem in AD 70. Bahnsen, on the other hand, is left out, trying to extend obligated
law observance for two thousand years into the Christian age.
It is, then, my understanding that Clark and Murray come the closest to the
biblical view (found in John Lightfoot as well). What Bahnsen does is put old wine into
new wine skins, and it simply does not work. The whole counsel of God is Scripture, and
all of our morality is to be defined therein. It is the final court, the final constitution of
our faith, for life and practice. But this hardly necessitates Bahnsen’s forced dilemma
that I must choose either autonomous “mere” human logic, or law. Rather, with Clark,
we must take the whole word of God and logically interpret its understanding in light of
everything Christ did and said. We must understand the time that he said it, and to whom
he said it. If this approach is abandoned, then exegesis is no more reliable than our
preconceived mold forms it to be.
Samuel Frost
Biblical Ethics (PHL 603)
Comparing and Contrasting
Gordon Clark, John Murray and Greg L. Bahnsen On Biblical Ethics..1
I wish to use Gordon Clark’s view as well as Murray’s and Bahnsen’s. Clark’s
view is briefly stated in Essays on Ethics and Politics (Trinity, 1992). Bahnsen’s two
books are considered, By This Standard: The Authority of God’s Law Today (ICE, 1985)
and Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Presbyterian & Reformed, 1977). John Murray’s
classic work referred to in this essay is Principles of Conduct: Aspects of Biblical Ethics
(Eerdmans, 2001 – reprinted from 1957).
Reformed theology has always asserted the necessity of applying the Christian
gospel to all cultures. Obviously, this is going to effect government and law. There is no
shortage in Reformation history of political theory. There is also no shortage of actual
examples of Christian experiments at governmental theory: Geneva, the Netherlands, the
Puritans, Scotland, Cromwellian England, and the early American colonists. One rule
underlies all of these attempts: All Scripture is relevant. Marcionism, antinomianism, and
secular humanism are discarded immediately. God’s word is the norm for all matters of
faith and practice.
I. General Thesis
Gordon Clark’s view with regards to biblical law is outlined in Essays under the
heading “Capital Punishment and the Bible” (12). On page 13,14 he wrote, “God
abolished the theocracy.” The reason behind this is, of course, the Gospel age. He bases
this on the Matthaen text found in 21:33-45 (“The Parable of the Unjust Vineyard
Workers”). There, the vineyard owner’s son return to the land and the tenants kill him.
The question asked by Jesus as to the fate of the tenants. They answer that they should
die a miserable death. What they did, in fact, was seal their own fate. In AD 70 Israel
was destroyed. Thus, “The kingdom would be taken from the Jews, the theocracy would.2
be ended, and a new order would be instituted…So it has happened. There no longer is
any chosen nation. Therefore the detailed civil and criminal code of Israel is no longer
binding.”
However, this logically cannot mean that “capital punishment is wrong.” To say
that the theocracy is abolished does not mean that the details of her law could not be
wisely adopted today. Then he concludes, “we might even wisely execute adulterers and
pornographers.” It is wrong, logically, to argue that if one or more laws in the law are
adopted all of them must be. This is just “bad logic.” The question is, “is capital
punishment ever right? must be answered in the affirmative.”
John Murray deals with the question under the chapter entitled “Law and Grace.”
The law “commands and demands” (184). It “propounds the will of God” for holy living
(184). The application of the law to the believer and to society is the will of God.
However, “the epochal change” (188) in the redemptive events of Christ’s work and
mission has altered the way the old covenant Israelite and the new covenant Christian
obey these commands. The Christian, as Paul, was “not under any obligation to observe
such rites and practices” of the Mosaic commands (189). Though he did, of course, as
the Acts tells us, and as Paul himself said: “to the Jew, I am a Jew.” Expediency and not
obligation is the notion here. So, for both Murray and Clark, the law, in principle is still
the governing standard of holiness, but many aspects, including many commands, are not
obligatory.
For Greg L. Bahnsen, the matter is not so simple. In some instances he clearly
states that the entire law is to be obeyed, and that no abrogation, not one jot or tittle, has
been altered. Yet, on the other hand, he states that “This is not to say that the re are no.3
changes from the Old to New Testament. Indeed, there are – important ones” (Standard,
3). His principle is one of continuity, not discontinuity. That is, unless the NT
specifically repeals any law then every law is in force. Thus, in this view, the ceremonial
laws and temple rites are repealed, or rather, confirmed in the fuller meaning of the Christ
event.
For Clark, every detailed is done away with, yet, on a logical score, this is not a
reason for rejecting their application out right. It is an “open question” as it pertains to
each detail (13). Murray uses the laws as a standard for holiness and sin, and Clark
would as well, but, as we shall see, not only does Murray reject the ceremonial aspects,
but some civil applications as well. Bahnsen endorses every jot and tittle, whether in
view of Christ from the ceremonial aspects (for example, we still have a High Priest), or
from civil justice.
II. Application of the thesis: Marriage
I will use the examples of marriage and penology to show the applications of their
views because these two issues form a comprehensive overview for each of them. First,
marriage. Let is be noted that Murray states, “Jesus is saying [in the Sermon on the
Mount] that he came not to abrogate any part of the Mosaic law” (150). Let us also note
that the Mosaic issued the death penalty for adultery. Murray admits as much on page
54. Having these two things in mind we may continue.
The texts in question on marriage are Dt 24:1-3; Mt 5:22. There, Jesus states that
one who divorces commits adultery if a second marriage takes place, unless for sexual
fornication. There is no need to go into what Jesus is saying here. Bahnsen gives such a
wide semantic domain to the word porneia that it almost means anything associated with.wrong sexual behavior. More on this later. The point in Murray is that Jesus does not seem to issue the death penalty for adultery in the case of a second marriage. Murray
writes, “In the exercise of [His] authority he abrogated….the Mosaic provisions
regarding divorce; by implication he abrogated the Old Testament sanction by which
divorce was penalized; and he instituted divorce for the cause of adultery” (57). From
what Murray says above, and from what he says here, we must say that Mur ray has
contradicted himself. Either Jesus did, or did not abrogate. It cannot be both.
Now, giving Murray his due, he does try to explain himself. On page 55 he
writes, “The abolition of the Old Testament penalty in no way interferes with the
permanent sanctity of the precept itself. It is the enhanced emphasis upon the sanctity of
the precept that makes possible the abrogation of the corporeal penalty.” In other words,
the abrogation of the death penalty for adultery enhances the sanctity of marriage.
Marriage, somehow, is seen as more holy by lessening the penalty for breaking its vows.
Rather than death (which would seem to surely emphasize the holiness of the union),
divorce suffices. Murray does not make much sense here. What it seems that he is
saying is that by abrogating the Mosaic statute, Jesus is not really abrogating it, but
fulfilling it.
Bahnsen sees the line of reasoning here as contradictory. An abrogation is an
abrogation whether it is in one, or in a jot, or a tittle. This is not a ceremonial law for
him, but a moral and civil one. “Christ did not in any way relax the law” (Theonomy,
98). From Matthew 19, however, Jesus appeals to what Murray calls the creation
ordinance of marriage (“In the beginning it was not so…”). Bahnsen is willing to say
that if Jesus did anything he strengthened the Mosaic ordinance. In Dt 24:1-4 “unclean.5
thing” is the cause for giving the wife a certificate of divorce (‘ervath dabar- indecency;
lit. nakedness of a matter – Heb.). The range of activity this might include appears to be
wide. The LXX uses aschemon pragma (shameful work). The connotation is clearly
sexual, but whether it is limited to porneia is a concern too lengthy for this essay.
Bahnsen defines porneia in the widest of ways. Re gardless of the definition,
Bahnsen does not quote the entire context of Matthew 19. After considering this, we will
sum up his presentation. The disciples replied to Jesus’ words with a startling reaction
that is not reproved by Jesus, but is, rather confirmed in his response. “But,” they say, “
if this is the case, then it is better not to marry!” If sexual indecency in the widest of
ways was meant, or if the Hebrew “unclean thing” was even wider semantically, then this
response seems hardly credible. They would be saying something to the effect, “if
divorce is allowed for a wide variety inordinately deemed immorality, then it is better not
to marry.” Jesus does not reprove them, but says, “Not everyone can accept this
teaching…others have renounced marriage because of the kingdom of heaven. The one
who can accept this should accept it” (Mt 19:10-12). The teaching in question is “anyone
who divorces his wife….and marries another.” What Jesus is saying is that it is better
not to marry, and that this restrictive measure is because of the approaching kingdom of
heaven. Do we not find Paul saying that same thing in I Co 7? And why does Paul
restrict marriage? “Because the time is short, brothers.” The eschatological dimension
must be considered.
Bahnsen is correct to say that capital punishment for adultery is not considered in
this passage. Neither is Moses contradicted with the woman caught in adultery (John
8:1- ff). By going back to the “beginning” Jesus affirms Moses, but certainly limits the.6
permissive nature of the Mosaic command. However, this teaching concerned “those
who could receive it.” In the main, though, Bahnsen stays true to his line of reasoning
that Jesus does not abrogate the Mosaic law. Murray on the other hand flatly contradicts
himself.
II. Penology
III.
We have seen that Murray abrogates the death penalty for adultery, whereas
Bahnsen does not. Clark, as noted above, sees no logical reason for rejecting outright the
wisdom found in putting the death the adulterer or pornographer. Yet, the reason for
Clark is logical analysis. For Clark, after the destruction of the theocratic kingdom of
Israel in AD 70, the whole law, in its detail, is no longer binding. But this hardly means
that it has no wisdom in its details, or that its details should not be considered for
governmental application. God commands that we study his word and seek to live it out
in our lives.
Bahnsen, on the other hand, stresses ethical obedience to the whole law, and that
Clark’s “latent antinomianism” is simply due to his placing reason above Scripture.
Again, he would charge Murray with the same, sharply disagreeing with him Theonomy.
Murray affirms the “creation ordinance” of the death penalty (Gn 9:2-5). He affirms the
“permanent relevance and validity” (112). But, this is for murder. Does the same hold
true for other crimes specifically mentioned in the Torah? Murray’s answer is clear, “It
is conceivable that the progress of revelation would remove the necessity for the penal
sanction. This is the case with the death penalty for adultery. And the same holds true
for many other penal sanctions in the Mosaic economy” (118). Again, since he abrogated
the death penalty for adultery the “implication [is that] he abrogated the Mosaic death
penalty” (119).
When considering polygamy and divorce in the older covenant, Murray notes that
these were permitted, yet restricted from gross abuse. A better word he uses is
“tolerated” (16). Yet, this does not make them legitimate for all time. “That is to say,
these practices were basically wrong; they were violations of the creation
ordinance…They were really contrary to the revealed will of God and rested under his
judgment” (16). Murray works out his theory much in the same way I do: by an appeal to
progressive revelation. The guidance of the Holy Spirit upon the collective community
of believers necessitates that a general ethic for Christian conduct will come into the
forefront, while all the while using the Scriptures as the stratum of truth. “We ha ve the
completion of the revelatory process” (18). For personal living each “existential
situation” must be confronted with Scripture and history. We cannot overestimate the
Holy Spirit in our hearts through the last days redemption in Jesus. But this is going over
the issue at hand. Let it be said that Murray abrogates several, if not most (except
murder) penal sanctions of the Mosaic law.
We have already noted that Murray stated further in the book that Jesus “is saying
that he came not to abrogate any part of the Mosaic law” (150). He agrees with my thesis
in Bahnsen’s outline for Theonomy in Christian Ethics given for this course; i.e., he
writes, “What we call the ritual or ceremonial comes within the scope of his declaration
as well as the moral” (ital. mine, 150). Bahnsen makes the distinction between form and
meaning. The law demands the perpetual validity for a High Priest. Jesus is our eternal
High Priest (yet he was not from the tribe of Levi, but Melchizadek). I found this.8
distinction to be arbitrary and forced. But I am saying too much at this point. The issue
here is how Murray can assert that Jesus came not to abrogate any of Moses’ law, yet, as
we have seen, abrogates quite a good deal of it under the rubric of “progressive
revelation.” How can this be? Murray, on the same page, wrote, “He did come to
discontinue the observance of the rites and ceremonies of the old economy. But it is not
correct to say that he came to abrogate them.” I cannot see any difference, and neither
could Clark. However, the appeal to a procession (a jot and tittle being abrogated in light
of the “things of the age to come” coming into their permanency through the transition
from Old to New is entirely my scheme, and is the appeal Murray makes). The problem
for Murray, though, is that he does not have any terminus.
The terminus for Bahnsen is “until the heavens and the earth pass away.” When
that happens, then abrogation will occur. Therefore, it is clear that for Bahnsen to remain
consistent, every penal sanction must receive its just application by the hand of the state.
None of them have been abrogated. “We too endorse the justice of God’s penal code, if
the Bible is to be the foundation for our Christian ethic” (Standard, 280).
IV. Conclusion.
Clark remains consistent in that he totally abrogates the entire theocratic system in
one fell swoop. Yet, logically, this does not mean that none of it applies, or can be
applied today. It is an open question and each proposal must be looked at in detail before
it can be decided. For Clark, the whole counsel of God is required for such a task.
However, he made it clear that we are not under any obligation to obey Mosaic law
simply because it is in the Bible. Many things are “in” the Bible that could not possibly.9
be applied today. This does not deter, however, from their intent and meaning. It may be
that we are obeying Christ in not applying them. The logic here is impeccable.
For Bahnsen, Clark’s view is akin to autonomous human reasoning (logic) over
God’s word. But that is not what Clark is saying. Clark stresses the whole counsel of
God, and the Bible is replete with justification for using logical rigidity. Bahnsen himself
somewhat echoes this sentiment. It is not a simple case of simply reading the Torah and
saying we will do this. Each case must be decided for itself. And Bahnsen applies the
whole counsel as well. He seems to make the issue forced, though, when he asks “by
what standard” are we to govern? Clark’s answer would unequivocally be God’s word.
The reason, in other words, Clark dismisses theonomy is simply because Scripture tells
him to do so. There are other alternatives that are just as biblically viable than
reconstructionism.
Murray’s view appeals to the much more gene ral creation ordinances. Indeed, the
Mosaic institution is seen as actually sanctioning and tolerating things that are flat out
wrong from the standpoint of these creation ordinances. For example, Moses permitted
divorce for a wide variety of things (whatsoever constitutes an “improper thing”) because
of the “hardness of heart. But it was not so in the beginning.” Here, Murray recognizes
that Jesus, while not abrogating Moses on this point, is over-riding him and appealing to
creation and the original function and purpose of the marriage bond. Yet Murray does
not stop here and insists that Jesus, by annulling the capital punishment for adultery was,
implicitly, annulling other capital offenses. In fact, he explicitly uses the word
“abrogate.” Murray never explains how this can be before heaven and earth pass away
except under the rubric of “progressive revelation” and that the Levitical system and.10
Mosaic penal code “anticipated” and formed an organic union with Christ, thus meeting
their fullness in his substance and thus ending in him.
Before we can go on, it is pertinent to make some notes on Bahnsen’s book By
This Standard. On page 132 he states, “The law of the Lord is fully and forever valid.”
He quotes Mt 5:17-19 for support. Murray correctly understood that when Jesus said this
he meant the law as it stood in Moses’ time. That is, he came not to abrogate the
Levitical laws, the dietary laws, or the ceremonial laws. The Temple stood, and the
priests were active and he meant for every Jew to carry out every jot and tittle of the law
as written. Let us resume with Bahnsen. “God’s law is eternal and is not to be altered”
(150). Yet, he also states that it is the word of God that instructs us “to see an altered
application of those laws” (ital. his, 164). Further, “The New Covenant word teaches
that some of God’s Old Covenant ordinances were not intended to be continuously
observed in the same manner throughout redemptive history…the Levitical priesthood
has been changed…Hence the sacrifices, feasts, etc. of the old order are not binding”
(165). This is a contradiction. The same as found in Murray, though Murray remedies it
with the notion of process of elimination in the fullness of revelation.
Not all Scripture is the law. The law is specifically referred to as the Mosaic law.
Secondly, if we accept Murray’s contention that Jesus meant every application of the law
as it was understood by the original audience, then Bahnsen’s distinction between
“meaning” and “form” fails. Bahnsen correctly pays attention to the “until the heavens
and the earth (land) pass away shall no wise the law will pass away” as being the
terminus. Both Murray and Bahnsen want a progressive revelation that, on the one hand
abrogates and alters the literal application, and on the other, fulfills the anticipatory-.11
shadowy form in the person of Christ. But how can this happen “unless the heavens and
the earth pass away”? If the terminus for any abrogation, any alteration, any change from
shadow to reality is found in the passing of the heavens and the earth, then the heavens
and the earth must also be progressively passing from the old to the new heavens and the
new earth. The logic here is missed by both scholars. You cannot have a change of the
law without a change of the heavens and the earth! Bahnsen wants alteration, and
Murray wants abrogation, but neither want to see the heavens and the earth as changing
into the new heavens and earth. There is a serious, serious problem here.
Either they are completely wrong here, or there was a change in the heavens and
the earth as well as a change in the abrogation/fullness/confirmation motif. You cannot
have any abrogation without affecting the terminus. Therefore, if the heavens and the
earth are taken as the literal Newtonian universe, then we have a major problem. If they
have not been changed, then no law has been abrogated in its least form at all. That is
the force of the combined exegesis of Murray and Bahnsen. It is the force of what Jesus
said. Until this matter is solved, the issue of law observance for today stands as an open
question.
As for Clark, he sees the entire theocratic nation as obliterated! This would mean
that the new heavens and the new earth are realities! You cannot have abrogation “until
the heavens and the earth pass away.” The only conclusion was that they were passing
away. The heavens and the Land (ghV in Greek is translated “earth,” “region,” or “land.”
Lightfoot notes that Israel in the Talmud was constantly referred to as “the Land” or
“haararts” in Hebrew – see Lightfoot’s, Commentary on the NT from the Talmud and
Hebraica: Volume I, Hendricksen. 1979; repr. 1859) must refer to, then, covenant Israel.
(“the Land”) and the Temple (“the heavens”). If Lightfoot’s exegesis is correct (and it is
most detailed), then the problem for Murray and Clark is solved, finding the terminus of
fulfillment from the old shadowy Levitical forms (the Law) in the final overthrowing of
Jerusalem in AD 70. Bahnsen, on the other hand, is left out, trying to extend obligated
law observance for two thousand years into the Christian age.
It is, then, my understanding that Clark and Murray come the closest to the
biblical view (found in John Lightfoot as well). What Bahnsen does is put old wine into
new wine skins, and it simply does not work. The whole counsel of God is Scripture, and
all of our morality is to be defined therein. It is the final court, the final constitution of
our faith, for life and practice. But this hardly necessitates Bahnsen’s forced dilemma
that I must choose either autonomous “mere” human logic, or law. Rather, with Clark,
we must take the whole word of God and logically interpret its understanding in light of
everything Christ did and said. We must understand the time that he said it, and to whom
he said it. If this approach is abandoned, then exegesis is no more reliable than our
preconceived mold forms it to be.
